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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MITCHELL D. HENDERSON, 
ILEEN BUTTARS, LAURENA B. 
HENDERSON, and DAVID HALE REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff/Respondents 
vs • 
FOR-SHOR COMPANY Supreme Court No. 20626 
Defendant/Appellant 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The Court is referred to Appellant's original brief and to 
Respondents1 Brief for a statement of issues presented on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Disposition of the Court Below 
The Court is referred to Appellant's original brief and 
Respondents1 brief for a statement regarding the nature of the 
case and disposition in the Court below. 
Statement of Facts 
In addition to facts outlined by Appellant in its original 
brief, Appellant offers the following facts: 
1. For-Shorfs invoices for rentals and purchases of forms 
and equipment from For-Shor included a title retention agreement. 
For-Shor retained title to all equipment rented and then 
purchased by Henderson until the equipment had been completely 
paid for. 
2. The payment of $6,400.00 by Mitchell Henderson was 
applied to his then outstanding account and, pursuant to the 
contract, was applied first to accrued interest, costs, and most 
recent purchases and then applied to the purchase of the forms. 
At no time did Henderson direct that said $6,400.00 payment was 
to be applied to the purchase the forms or to give any directions 
other than to apply said $6,400.00 on the account. (TV II p. 270, 
1.19 - p. 271, 1.22) As such, the forms had not been paid for 
and title remained with For-Shor. 
3. The only forms that would or could have been purchased 
by Ileen Buttars were the forms in which First Security Bank held 
a security interest. At no time did Mrs. Buttars believe or 
understand that she was purchasing any other forms. As stated in 
Respondents Brief, Mrs. Buttars knew nothing of For-Shor, and, 
therefore, could not and did not purchase forms originally 
received from For-Shor. 
4. Although Mrs. Buttars had allegedly owned the forms for 
a period of almost three years, the only time during the entire 
three year period of claimed ownership in which any revenue was 
generated from the forms was during a very brief three month 
period from April, 1981 to July, 1981. 
5. Neither Mrs. Buttars nor Mitchell Henderson made any 
effort after July 9, 1981, when the forms were repossesed, to 
attempt to rent out the remaining forms or otherwise mitigate 
possible damages. This is so even though For-Shor repossesed 
only approximately one-half of one set, and Mrs. buttars allegedly 
purchased two and one-half sets, leaving two sets available to 
rent. 
6. At no time during the trial did Plaintiff/Respondents 
ever definitively state an amount claimed as damages for loss of 
rentals. Even in Respondents Brief, Respondents state that the 
"revenue for those three to four months was approximately 
$2,500.00". (See Respondents Brief, last line of page 5 to first 
line of page 6, emphasis added.) 
7. At no time during the Trial did Plaintiffs/Respondents 
offer sufficient evidence regarding the value of the forms. At 
no time did any witness give any specific value for the forms 
repossesed by For-Shor Company. 
8. Exhibit 28, which contained a 1982 suggested price 
list, was not introduced for the purpose of establishing the 
value of the forms nor was it accepted for that purpose, and was 
specifically objected to by Appellant's attorney. 
9. Even if For-Shor employees trespassed on Laurena 
Henderson's property at the time of repossessing the forms, there 
was no damage done to her property and there is no evidence in 
support of an award of damages in any amount, let alone $100.00. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The court is referred to Appellant's original Brief for a 
summary of Appellant's arguments and the issues raised by 
Appellant on appeal. 
In addition, Appellant replies to Respondents issues raised 
on appeal as follows: 
1. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. There is 
no evidence that would justify an award of damages for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress and the Trial 
Court's refusal to award any damages was proper. 
2. Failure to Admit. There is no basis to the claim that 
the Trial Court abused its discretion in failing to award 
attorney fees to Plaintiffs. Defendant offered several reasons 
as justifications for the appearance of the bankruptcy notice in 
Defendant's files and the Court did not abuse it discretion in 
accepting Defendant's reasons. 
3. Interference With Favorable Business Relationships. 
There is no evidence of intent by For-Shor to interfere with any 
business relationships. For-Shor repossesed the forms in a 
reasonable and prudent manner and relied on legal counsel in 
repossessing forms. Furthermore, there is no evidence of damages 
caused nor was it established that there was a business 
relationship. 
ARGUMENTS DIRECTED TO APPELLANT'S 
ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL 
I. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT PLAINTIFF'S 
CLAIM FOR LOSS OF PROFITS OR RENTAL 
Respondents claim that they are entitled to damages for loss 
of rentals for a period of approximately three years from the 
time the forms were repossesed by For-Shor until the trial, even 
though no efforts were made by Plaintiffs to rent to forms for 
the first three years that Mrs. Buttars claims to have owned the 
forms. Respondents claim that when Mitchell Henderson decided to 
try to rent the forms, there were "plenty of takers" and that 
"all of the forms in Cache Valley were being used that summer," 
(Respondents' Brief, p. 23) supposedly indicating that Plaintiffs 
would have had no problem renting the forms steadily for the 
additional three years. The fact still remains that Plaintiffs' 
only history of rentals was during a brief three month period 
from April, 1981 to July, 1981, even though Mrs. Buttars had 
allegedly owned the forms for three years. To assume that 
Plaintiffs would have continued to rent the forms at the same 
rate, if at all, or that they would have completely rented the 
forms to contractors for the entire forming season for the years 
1982, 1983 and 1984, is totally speculative. Plaintiffs offered 
testimony indicating that Mitchell Henderson's health had been 
poor for several years, eventually causing him to discontinue his 
business in 1978 and seek help from his grandmother to pay the 
loans on the forms to keep the bank from foreclosing on the 
forms. Plaintiff also claimed that his health was poor after the 
repossession. This testimony shows that Plaintiff did not have 
the ability to rent the forms. 
In addition, Plaintiffs were not engaged in any ongoing 
venture at the time of the repossession. Plaintiffs had only a 
sporadic history of rentals over the three years of claimed 
ownership. 
Even if the Court were to allow damages for loss of 
rentals, those rentals must be apportioned over the full three 
years of claimed ownership, and the Court must consider that any 
rentals generated were from two and one half sets. Defendant 
only repossesed one-half set. Thus, Plaintiffs claimed rentals 
of "approximately $2,500.00" (Defendant points out on page 33 of 
its original brief that the Exhibits indicate rentals of only 
$2,034.55) must be attributed to all of the forms for the full 
three years, for total damages allowable over the next three 
years claimed by Plaintiffs on the half-set repossesed by For-
Shor (1981-1984) of $500.00 ($2,500.00 X .25). 
Plaintiffs also made no effort whatsoever to attempt to rent 
the remaining forms or otherwise mitigate their damages. 
Plaintiffs still had two full sets of forms available, even after 
the half set had been repossesed by For-Shor. There is no 
testimony that Plaintiffs would have been required to combine 
Mod-U-Form forms with Wall Master forms, because there was 
apparently a full set of each kind. Plaintiffs still had forms 
to rent, but completely failed to rent any more forms following 
the July 9, 1981 repossession. 
It also makes no difference whether other Cache Valley 
contractors were successful in keeping busy or that For-Shor 
Company rented the forms it had repossesed for the three years. 
Both Mr. Mortenson (a contractor) and For-Shor Company are highly 
successful businesses with a proven track records spanning many 
years. The same cannot be said for either Mitchell Henderson or 
David Hales. 
In short, there is no evidence to justify a holding and 
award of damages for loss of rents for a period of three years. 
The evidence as presented to the Court simply does not justify 
such an award. Plaintiffs did not establish that they had the 
ability and could have rented the forms for the entire three year 
period had the forms been available, nor did Plaintiffs establish 
the amount of rentals which would have been received even if the 
forms had been available and had Plaintiffs been able to rent the 
forms. The Trial Court also did not properly apportion the 
rentals over the full three years. The loss of profit from 
rentals claimed by Plaintiffs is simply too speculative and the 
Court's award of damages for loss of rentals should be reversed. 
II 
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH 
THE VALUE OF THE FORMS REPOSSESSED BY FOR-SHOR 
At no time did Plaintiffs establish the value of the forms 
at the time they were taken form Laurena Hendersonfs property on 
July 9, 1981. During the trial, Plaintiff's attorney was 
questioning James Snarr, the general manager of For-Shor Company, 
attempting to have Mr. Snarr interpolate the value of new forms 
as of 1984 based on a 1982 suggested price. Defendant's counsel 
then suggested to Plaintiff's attorney that he ask Mr. Snarr to 
calculate and give testimony regarding the value of the forms 
that were taken on July 9, 1981 as of the time they were taken. 
This suggestion, however, was refused by Plaintiff's attorney. 
The discussion was as follows (beginning with line 12 on page 
440, TV III): 
MR. JENKINS: Counsel, maybe to save time, are you 
asking him to calculate the value of the forms that were 
taken on July 9, 1981? 
MR. ZOLLINGER: Uh-huh. 
MR. JENKINS: Why don't you just ask him? He can do 
that. He's already done it. 
MR. ZOLLINGER: Afraid I might get the wrong answer. 
MR. JENKINS: He's already done it. Well, it you want 
his testimony. 
Shortly thereafter, on cross examination, Defendant's 
counsel asked Mr. Snarr if he could determine the value of the 
forms at the time they were repossesed on July 9, 1981. (TV III 
p. 442 1. 9-19, p. 443.) Plaintiffs objected to the question, 
claiming it to be based on hearsay and statements by Dan Sharp, 
who had actually picked up the forms. The Court overruled the 
Plaintiff's objections and allowed the testimony. The witness 
then stated that he needed to make a few calculations. Rather 
than have Mr. Snarr make the calculations at that time to 
determine the 1-981 price, Defendant's attorney decided to move on 
to other questioning and never did ask Mr. Snarr to give a 1981 
value. At no other time during the entire trial did any person 
offer testimony regarding the value of the forms at the time they 
were taken. 
Plaintiffs, however, attempted to determine the price for 
the forms as follows: 
1982 Price 1984 Price Totals 
55 2' X 8' panels 96.00 X 8% = 103.68 5,702.40 
24 2' X 8" panels 53.00 X 8% = 57.24 1,373.76 
2 8' X 6' inside corners 65.00 X 8% -
2 8' X 6f inside corners 32.00 X 8% = 
900 wedge bolts .28 X ? = 
68 .04 
34 .56 
.28 
7 
136.08 
69 .12 
252 .00 
, 533 .36 
^76 Deduct 24% for used 
$5,725.35 
The above figures are based on Mr. Snarr's testimony 
indicating that the 1984 price for the forms was approximately 
8% higher than the 1982 price. Plaintiffs then used the 1982 
suggested price list (Exhibit 23) to obtain a figure for the 
forms as of 1982, multiplied that figure by 8%, and then reduced 
the figure by 24% for used forms, which was based on Mr. Snarr's 
testimony calculating that the cost of reconditioning forms was 
approximately 23.8% of the new price. 
It should be noted, as stated in Appellant's original brief, 
that Exhibits 26 and 28, which are the original and a copy of 
the same thing were objected to by Defendant's counsel because the 
Exhibits are prepared in an attempt to settle the law suit and as 
an offer to settle the law suit. The Court received the 
documents under Rule 803 (6) of the Utah Rules of evidence as a 
business record used by For-Shor in its business and only for 
that purpose. Thee Court further stated "I can't interpret it," 
(TV II p. 253 1. 11-13.) Exhibits 26 and 28 were not accepted 
into evidence for the purpose of establishing the value of the 
forms as they were taken in 1981 , but only for the purpose of an 
in-house record. The method used by Plaintiffs, however, does 
not determine nor offer any evidence as to the value of the forms 
repossesed by For-Shor Company in July 1981. The proper 
determination of damages would be to establish the value of those 
specific forms which were taken by For-Shor on July 9, 1 981 , and 
not to attempt to take some other figure for other forms and 
attempt to adjust those nebulous values to current values and 
then reduce those values by a certain percentage because they were 
used. The forms repossesed by For-Shor could have been in 
better or worse shape that the mythical forms for which 
Plaintiffs attempted to establish a value. Also, the forms were 
repossesed in 1981 and the base price used by Plaintiff is an 
alleged 1982 price. Plaintiffs then tried to increase the price 
to a 1984 price, the time of the trial, rather than showing a 
1981 value. 
Had Plaintiff simply asked Mr. Snarr during his testimony 
what the value of those forms was at the time they were taken, Mr. 
Snarr being an expert witness in such matters, the value could 
have been established. Plaintiffs could have further offered 
other experts to determine a value of the forms at the time that 
they were taken. However, Plaintiffs attempted to use some 
circuitous method to arrive at their suggested value, and by 
doing so utterly failed to establish any value for the forms. 
Since there is no evidence or insufficient evidence, 
regarding the value of the forms at the time they were taken, the 
Trial Court's award of damages for the value of those forms must 
be reversed. 
ARGUMENTS DIRECTED TO RESPONDENT'S 
ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL 
III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED MITCHELL 
HENDERSON'S CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION 
OF MENTAL DISTRESS. 
Plaintiff, Mitchell Henderson, claims that he should be 
compensated for his alleged mental anguish caused by For-Shor's 
repossession of the forms. The Trial Court refused to award Mr. 
Henderson damages, stating that no damages were awarded because 
the forms were not his forms. Even if the Court ruled that the 
forms belonged to Mr. Henderson or that it made no difference 
who owned the forms, the Court could not have awarded damages for 
Henderson's claim for intentional infliction of mental distress. 
In order for Mr* Henderson to prevail on a claim for intentional 
infliction of mental distress, the following elements must be proven: 
1. The Defendant intentionally engaged in some 
conduct toward the Plaintiff, (a) with the purpose of 
inflicting emotional distress, or, (b) where any 
reasonable person would have known that such would 
result; and 
2. his actions are of such a nature as to be 
considered outrageous and intolerable and that they 
offend against the generally accepted standards of 
decency and of morality. Sams v. Eccles, 11 U.2d 289, 
358 P.2d 344, 347 (1961). 
The Arizona Supreme Court in the matter of Venerias v. 
Johnson, 622 P.2d 55, 58 (Ariz. App., 1982), outlined the 
elements of the tort as follows: 
There are four elements which must coincide to 
impose liability for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress: (1) The conduct must be intentional or 
wreckless; (2) The conduct must be extreme and out-
rageous; (3) There must be a causal connection between 
the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress; and 
(4) the emotional distress must be severe. 
It should be noted that in Samms v. Eccles the Court 
recognized a cause of action for intentional infliction of severe 
emotional distress, thus closely paralleling the Arizona 
elements, Arizona only adding the requirement for a causal 
connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional 
distress, which would be necessary in any claim for relief. 
The following statements from the Restatement of Torts and 
Prosser also indicate the requirements necessary to establish a 
cause of action for' intentional infliction of emotional (mental) 
In short, the rule stated in this section imposes 
liability for intentionally causing severe emotional 
distress in those situations in which the actor conduct 
has gone beyond all reasonable bounds of decency. The 
prohibited conduct is conduct which in the eyes of 
decent men and women, in a civilized community, is con-
sidered outrageous and intolerable. Generally, the case 
is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average 
member of the community would arouse his resentment 
against the actor and lead him to exclaim "outrageous". 
Restatement of the Law, Torts, 1948 Supp., Sec. 46, 
Comment G. 
So far as it is possible to generalize from the cases, 
the rule which seems to have emerged is that there is 
liability for conduct exceeding all bounds usually 
tolerated by decent society, of a nature which is 
especially calculated to cause, and does cause, mental 
distress of a very serious kind. Law of Torts, 4th Edition, 
William L. Prosser, page 56. 
In Samms v. Eccles, the Supreme Court of Utah reversed the 
District Court's dismissal of the action of Mrs. Samms, a married 
woman, for injury resulting from severe emotional distress she 
claimed to have suffered because the defendant persistently 
annoyed her with proposals to have elicit sexual relations. The 
defendant had repeatedly and persistently called Mrs. Samms by 
phone at various hours including late at night and on one 
occasion came to her residence in connection with a solicitation 
and made an indecent exposure of his person. The trial court had 
dismissed the claim for no cause of action on the basis that the 
courts had been historically wary of the possible dangers in 
opening doors for recovery of emotional distress because of the 
highly subjective and volatile nature of the tort and the 
difficulty of establishing damages. The Supreme Court, however, 
allowed the cause of action basing it on the elements as stated 
above. 
In a more recent case, First Security Bank v. J.B.J. Feed 
Yards, Utah, 653 P.2d 591, 598 (1982), this Court cautioned that 
"damages for mental anguish are an extreme remedy, which should 
be dispensed with caution." In Midas Muffler v. Ellison, 650 
P.2d 496 (Ariz. App., 1982) the Arizona Court recognized and 
cited with authority the elements necessary to impose liability 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress as stated in 
Venerias v. Johnson, supra., in refusing to award damages for an 
alleged infliction of severe emotional distress. The Court 
stressed the necessity of strictly complying with all of the 
elements of the tort. In that case, Midas Muffler was owed 
$178.50 for the installation of a muffler on Ellison's vehicle. 
The account was turned over to a collection agency and although 
Ellison's had paid the amount claimed, the amount was not 
properly credited by Midas. Midas then referred the account to a 
second collection agency which made six telephone calls over a 
three month period, using abusive language, threatening to sue 
and calling Mrs. Ellison a liar. Mrs. Ellison claimed that she 
became greatly distraught, had difficulty sleeping, and that the 
calls made her cry. The Arizona court ruled that the conduct 
was not so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery, stating: 
"certainly six phone calls by Kiva [the collection agency] 
over a period of three months cannot be considered ex-
cessive nor can we say that the languagae used by Kiva's 
employee was so atrocious as to be utterly intolerable in 
a civilized community." 650 P.2d at 500. 
In the instant action, Plaintiff Mitchell Henderson has not 
met any of the necessary elements in order to prove a cause of 
action for intentional infliction of mental distress. There is 
no testimony, nor even an indication, that For-Shor intended to 
cause any emotional distress to Mitchell Henderson. For-Shorfs 
claim to the forms is based on its title retention agreement and 
its belief, after consultation with legal counsel, that it had a 
right to properly repossess the forms. The forms were 
repossessed without incident and only the forms claimed by For-
Shor were repossessed. 
The testimony also indicated that Mitchell Henderson had a 
history of health problems leading to the failure of his business 
and the resulting bankruptcy. Any anguish caused by For-Shor's 
repossession of the forms could not be considered to have been 
caused by the repossession, but was a result of Mr. Henderson's 
previous illnesses, physical infirmities, and business failure 
prior to the repossession. Furthermore, there was no showing of 
any emotional distress after the repossession or that any 
distress as may have been suffered by Mr. Henderson was severe. 
Plaintiff complained only of headaches, sick stomach and other 
stress-type illnesses as ulcers. 
Plaintiff Mitchell Henderson failed to meet even one of the 
elements necessary to allow the Court to award damages for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress and he further 
failed to prove any amount for damages, nor did Plaintiff attempt 
to prove damages even had he been successful in making the claim. 
The Trial Court's refusal to grant Mitchell Henderson's claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress must be sustained. 
IV 
THE TRIAL COURT HAD SUFFICIENT BASIS TO REFUSE 
THE AWARD FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES REGARDING 
THE BANKRUPTCY NOTICE. 
Plaintiffs claim that they should have been awarded costs 
and fees for proving that the bankruptcy notice discovered in 
Defendant's files was of the same generation of copies originally 
sent by the Bankruptcy Court. Even assuming the copy came from 
the Bankruptcy Court, that in no way proves that Defendant knew 
or was aware of Mitchell Henderson's bankruptcy. James Snarr, 
general manager of For-Shor Company, testified that he had no 
knowledge and at no time was aware of Mitchell Henderson's 
bankruptcy until the filing of the action of Mr. Henderson. 
(TV II, p.235, 1. 9-14) Dan Sharp, the former collection manager 
for For-Shor Company, also testified that he did not know of any 
bankruptcy filed by Mr. Henderson. (TV II, p. 305, 1. 6-12). 
Even For-Shor's attorney, Mr. Burnett, was not aware of the 
Bankruptcy. (TV I, p. 152). Mr. Burnett stated that he had been 
able to obtain a copy from the bankruptcy file in an effort to 
explain how the notice could have been placed in the For-Shor 
file. Furthermore, Mr. Snarr testified that the address 
indicated on the bankruptcy notice may have been sent to its 
neighbor, Con-Shor Company. The notice could have then been 
later delivered to an employee of For-Shor who placed it in the 
file without informing Mr. Snarr or other managers of the company. 
In any event, the testimony is quite clear that For-Shor was 
not aware of the Bankruptcy. Even if the form discovered in For-
Shor's file came from the Bankruptcy Court, it does not prove 
that For-Shor knew of the bankruptcy. Therefore, the Trial Court 
was justified in not awarding costs and fees to Plaintiffs and 
the Trial Court's decision should be upheld. 
V 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT INTENTIONALLY 
INTERFERED WITH THE BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS OF 
PLAINTIFFS 
Plaintiffs claim that For-Shor's repossession of the forms 
terminated the potential sale of forms from Mrs. Buttars to David 
Hale, and further caused damage to Mr. Hale for losing business. 
Although Defendant had learned of the existence of the forms 
through David Hale, Defendant was not aware that David Hale was 
intending to purchase those specific forms nor did Defendant 
intend to interfere with any business relationships or contraacts 
that may have existed between the Plaintiffs. Defendant was 
acting in a reasonable manner soley for the purpose of protecting 
its interest. 
The elements necessary to establish a claim for intentional 
interference with prospective economic relations is outlined in 
Leigh Furniture and Carpet Company v. Isom, Utah, 657 P.2d 293 
(1982). The Court outlined the elements as follows: 
We recognize a common law cause of action for intentional 
interference with prospective economic relations, and 
adopt the Oregon definition of this tort. Under this 
definition, in order to recover damages, the Plaintiff 
must prove (1) that the defendant intentionally inter-
fered with the plaintifffs existing or potential economic 
relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by improper means, 
(3) causing injury to the plaintiff. 657 P.2d at 304. 
In Leigh v. Isom, Leigh Furniture had pursued Isom to 
repossess Isomfs interest in a furniture business, which Leigh 
had sold to Isom, and to obtain a deficiency judgment. Isom 
counterclaimed for intentional interference with contractual 
relations* The jury entered a verdict for Isom on all matters. 
Isom had purchased the furniture business from Leigh on contract 
in 1970. The contract also included a long term lease on the 
building for ten years with an option to renew for an additional 
ten years and also an option to purchase the building. The facts 
indicated that shortly after approximately one year, Leigh began 
to harass and otherwise cause problems for Isom which lasted for 
a period of more than three and one-half years, culminating in 
the failure of Isomfs business. Mr. Leigh and other associates, 
including his wife, visited Isom at the store on an almost weekly 
basis during one period of time to make demands and accusations 
of Isom. Leigh further made other demands of Isom to obtain a 
partner and then refused to permit the association of the 
partner. Leigh refused to make payments or to provide 
maintenance for the building pursuant to the lease agreement and 
caused two frivolous law suits to be filed against Isom. The 
facts also indicated that Leigh wanted the building returned to 
him and intended to force Isom out of business for the purpose of 
terminating the lease in order to sell the building for a greater 
profit. This Court concluded that the incidents taken 
separately would not have been, in and of themselves, tortious, 
and stated: 
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Even in small groups, these acts might be explained 
as merely instances of aggressive or abrasive - though 
not illegal or tortious - tactics, excesses that occur 
in contractual or commercial relationships. But in 
total and in cumulative effect, as a course of action 
extending over a period of three and one-half years and 
culminating in the failure of Isom's business, the 
corporation's acts cross the threshold beyond what is 
incidental and justifiable to what is tortious. 657 P.2d 
at 306. 
The facts of the instant case are very distinguishable and 
are in no way similar to the facts in the Leigh case giving rise 
to damages, and the facts and evidence in the instant action do 
not satisfy the elements necessary for the Court to have awarded 
damages for intentional interference with economic relations. 
Those actions can be reviewed as follows: 
Intentional Interference and Causation 
There was no evidence at trial to indicate that For-Shor 
Company intended to interfere with the prospective business 
dealings between Mr. Hale and Mrs. Buttars. Plaintiffs merely 
speculate in their brief that For-Shor repossessed the forms upon 
the supposition that it would destroy Mitchell Henderson's 
business, eliminate competition, and require David Hale to rent 
forms from For-Shor Company. Such speculation goes beyond 
reason. For-Shor had ample business and did not need to "squeeze 
out its competitors'1 nor did it need to resort to such tactics in 
order to get business. In fact, For-Shor was unaware that 
Mitchell Henderson had even rented out the forms and did not know 
that Mitchell Henderson considered himself to be in the business 
of renting forms and, thus, in competition with For-Shor. 
Even assuming that For-Shor intended to interfere with 
Plaintiffs business, Plaintiffs did not prove that such 
interference was the cause of any damages which may have been 
suffered by Plaintiffs. There was no contract for the sale of 
the forms. At best, Hale and Henderson merely contemplated the 
transaction. The testimony indicated that Mr. Hale was unable to 
obtain financing and that he had no assets with which to purchase 
the property. Furthermore, Mr. Hale had never been in business 
for himself, had only two confirmed jobs on which he anticipated 
making only a few hundred dollars. Quite clearly he had no 
history or background with which to support or substantiate a 
claim for future loss of profit or loss of business. If indeed 
Defendant did intend to put Hales out of business, the evidence 
suggests that Defendant did him a favor because his "business" 
was so poorly run he was losing money on each job. The evidence 
presented at trial was insufficient and would force the Trial 
Court, or this Court, to speculate at best as to what the nature 
of the damages were. Even in Plaintiff's Trial Brief, Plaintiffs 
state that David Hale was forced to "expend approximately 
$1,500.00 -- $2,000.00 in extra time, wages, rent and other 
expenses to get jobs done." (Plaintiff's Trial Brief, top of page 
9.) Plaintiffs are still unsure of any damages which may have 
been caused by any interference. 
Therefore, even if Plaintiffs had been able to prove that 
Defendant intentionally interfered with their business relations, 
Plaintiffs did not and could not prove that such interference 
caused any damages because Plaintiffs could not prove that they 
had an ability to carry out their contemplated transactions. 
Improper Purpose or Improper Means 
Defendant reasonably believed that it had a right to 
repossess the forms pursuant to its title retention agreement and 
did so by proper means. Defendant complied with all requirements 
of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code in repossessing the property 
and did not repossess the property for the purpose of injuring 
the Plaintiffs or interfering with their relationships. 
Therefore, Plaintiffs can not satisfy the second element 
required. 
Injury to Plaintiff 
As stated earlier, Plaintiffs have been unable to show that 
they have been injured or otherwise prove damages. 
It should be further noted that Plaintiffs did not plead as 
a cause of action interference with contract or interference with 
business relationship. However, as noted in Leigh, Defendant had 
a privilege and a right to repossess the forms under the title 
retention agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant has shown in this brief and in Defendant's 
original brief that there was either no evidence or insufficient 
evidence presented to the court in order to allow the Court to 
award damages to Plaintiffs for loss of rentals and for the value 
of the forms. The only evidence presented at trial was sketchy, 
inconclusive and speculative. Therefore, the judgment of the 
District Court awarding damages to Plaintiffs should be reversed 
on all counts. 
Similarly, Plaintiffs failed to establish a claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress or intentional 
interference with prospective business relationships. The 
District Court's decision not to grant judgment to Plaintiffs for 
no cause of action should be sustained, as well as the District 
Court's refusal to grant attorneys fees and costs to Plaintiffs 
for attempting to prove that Defendant was aware of Mitchel 
Henderson's bankruptcy. 
Respectfully submitted this / day of October, 1985. 
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